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ABSTRACT: The price of professional portfolio management provided by the mutual 
fund adviser depends not only on the fund characteristics but also on the fund objective, 
the adviser’s portfolio related and management based decisions, and the portfolio 
performance. I analyze the advisory fee, using a survivorship bias free data set of 176 
equity funds managed by 125 different advisers. Advisers benchmark the objective 
average but this benefit the shareholders only when the objective trend is descending. 
Advisers tend to reduce the cost of their marginal product through the use of derivatives 
or manipulate by engaging in soft dollar agreements. I find that the advisers actively 
manage the advisory fee contracts responding to the outcome of their management 
decisions. The advisory fee increases after voluntary fee reimbursement or if the adviser 
is not fully reimbursed for the compensation of independent directors and officers.  
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ÖZET: Profesyonel portföy yönetim hizmetinin bedeli fon özelliklerinin yanı sıra, fon 
cinsine, fon yöneticisinin direkt portföy ilişkili ve kurum yönetimi ilişkili kararlarına ve 
portföyün performansına bağlıdır. Çalışmada 125 farklı kurum tarafından yönetilen 176 
hisse senedi fonu incelenmektedir. Fon yönetimi Pazar hizmet fiyatı ortalamasını veri 
almakta ancak bu strateji ancak trend azalan karakterde olduğu durumlarda fon 
hissedarlarının lehine işlemektedir. Fon yöneticileri hizmetlerinin masrafını türev 
araçlarını kullanarak azaltabilmekte ya da “soft dollar” anlaşmalarına girerek 
manipule etmektedir. Fon yönetim bedeli zorunlu olmayan kesinti aflarını ve bağımsız 
yöneticilerin masraflarının fon hissedarlarınca tam olarak karşılanmadığı dönemlerden 
sonra artış göstermektedir.  
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Yatırım fonları, fon yönetim bedeli, kontrat, fon yönetimi. 
 
1. Introduction 
Mutual funds have been displaying dramatic growth for over a decade and this dynamic 
financial service industry has been getting increasing attention from the regulators, 
academia, and the press. Despite this rapid growth and dynamic structure of the mutual 
funds industry, the attention devoted to the advisory contracts which determines the price 
of the primary product, professional portfolio management, is limited. 
 
Optimal contracts should provide a strong link between managerial compensation and 
investor welfare when there is little known by the investors about the production function 
linking their objective function and manager’s objective function (Murphy 1998). Since 
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each fund and each adviser is unique, so the contracts should be. The advisory fee 
contract defines the optimal advisory fee, the major component of the total fee; that 
covers solely the cost of portfolio management, provides profit to the adviser and still 
attracts additional inflows. Other components of the fund’s total fee are 12b-1 fees, 
which are used to compensate broker-dealers for selling efforts, transfer agent fees, and 
accounting and legal expenses. Funds also charge loads that incur when fund shares are 
purchased (front-end load) and redeemed (back-end load). 
 
Coles et al (2000) argue that the optimal fee structure varies between funds. Furthermore, 
Deli (2002) provides evidence implying that the fund characteristics have impact on the 
variation of the advisory fee. However, the economic determinants of the advisory fee 
would not be limited to the fund characteristics for couple of reasons. First, the advisory 
fee is not bound by any regulation such as 12b-1 fees. Due to its largely unconstrained 
nature, the advisory fee will depend on the contract environment (Jensen and Meckling 
(1976), Deli (2002). Therefore, market dynamics and norms are likely to affect the 
optimal advisory fee. Second, Tufano and Sevick (1997) suggest that advisory contracts 
are largely the products of advisory firms themselves. Therefore, the advisory fee is 
dependent on the adviser’s decisions. These decisions might be directly related to 
portfolio management such as the use of derivatives or they might be management 
decisions exogenous to cost of portfolio management such as voluntary reimbursement 
of fees. The adviser is also expected to attempt to distinguish himself based on the 
quality of his marginal product. Therefore, the adviser is likely to try to signal abnormal 
performance as an indicator of superior management skills. 
 
Overall, the economic determinants of the optimal advisory fee are not limited to the 
fund characteristics. While the adviser takes the fund characteristics, the market norms 
and fund performance given, he or she could actively manage the advisory fee through 
his or her own management decisions. The adviser would consider these four set of 
factors while adopting an advisory fee strategy. 
 
In a competitive market such as mutual funds where funds are pushed to compete on the 
fees, the adviser would determine the additional mark-up to advisory fee observing the 
market norms and competitors’ advisory fees. This would not require a fundamental 
change to the cost structure as long as the premium is high enough for the adviser. 
However, the competition would limit the degree of mark-up. Hence, this would lead the 
adviser to attempt to find ways to reduce the cost of portfolio management. In that case, 
the advisor has broadly two options. First, the adviser may alter the portfolio 
management techniques or reimburse fees. Second, he or she may simply manipulate the 
fee contract in order to reduce the contractual advisory fee without actually changing the 
total rent transfer from shareholders. 
 
Using a survivorship bias free sample of 176 equity funds managed by 125 different 
advisors, I investigate how the dynamic advisory fee management is associated with the 
adviser’s decisions and the given factors such as fund characteristics, market norms and 
performance. I find that fund characteristics have an impact on the advisory fee. The 
advisory fee decreases with fund size, but increases with the adviser’s size. I find that the 
advisory fee is adjusted based on the objective average. However, this strategy benefits 
the shareholder only when the objective average fee declines. 
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Advisory fee determination is associated with both the portfolio related and the 
management related decisions of the adviser. Several results support this conclusion. I 
find that, the adviser successfully reduces the cost of portfolio management by using 
derivatives or manipulate the advisory fee by engaging in research agreements. Also, 
funds that bundle the gross administrative fee and gross advisory fee have a higher 
contractual advisory fee. Contracting is further affected by ex ante voluntary fee 
reimbursement by the advisory firm. Advisers do not adjust the advisory fee based on the 
overall number of non-reimbursed services. However, when the non-reimbursement is 
examined at the individual service level, the results indicate that advisers adjust the 
advisory fee based on the non-reimbursement of certain services. 
 
Finally, not necessarily performance improvement but superior performance gives the 
adviser the opportunity to successfully signal better management skills and increase the 
advisory fee. Since Jensen (1968), the majority of the studies show that mutual fund 
managers fail to outperform passive benchmarks. However, superior performance is still 
likely to serve as a signal of better management skills.  
 
Section 2 discusses the variables and hypothesis. Section 3 provides information on the 
data and methodology. Section 4 presents descriptive statistics, discusses empirical 
results, and limitations. Section 5 concludes and suggests possible future research.  
 
2. Variables and Hypotheses 
 
2.1 Advisory fee 
Literature provides evidence that advisory contracts differ based on fund characteristics. 
However, the adviser would consider different sets of factors simultaneously for the 
advisory fee determination. Besides the fund characteristics, the adviser’s fee decision 
would be constrained by the norms imposed by the market dynamics; influenced by the 
incentive to signal superior management skills, and determined by the management 
decisions. 
 
2.1.1. Fund specific factors  
The literature provides evidence that fund size significantly affects the advisory fee. 
Smaller funds and funds of smaller advisers have higher advisory fees (Deli (2002)), thus 
economies of scale exists.1 Furthermore, a better informed adviser is more likely to 
engage in a greater amount of information-motivated trading leading to a higher turnover 
rate (Ippolito (1992), Edelen (1999), Deli (2002)). Nevertheless, it has also been 
suggested that a high turnover rate could be the result of the manager’s excess risk-taking 
motivated by poor performance (Brown et al. (1996), Khorana (2001)). Moreover, it 
could be higher rent transfer that gives incentive to the fund management to increase the 
amount of transactions. Therefore, the relation between turnover and the advisory fee is 
an empirical question. 
 
Tufano and Sevick (1997) point out that a higher minimum investment will reduce the 
number of shareholder accounts, and have a negative effect on the total fee, increasing 
                                                 
1 McLeod and Malhotra (1994); Malhotra and McLeod (1997); Latzko (1999); Rea et al. 
(1999); Securities and Exchange Commission (2000); LaPlante (2001); Latzko (2004). ), and 
Fortin 
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the monitoring power of shareholders. On the other hand, distribution of the fixed part of 
the management cost over a larger number of accounts decreases the cost per account. 
Freeman and Brown (2000) challenge the latter argument suggesting that additional 
shareholder accounts resembles “the effect of adding viewers on the creative cost of 
devising a TV show.” and should not affect the management cost. Thus, the relation 
between the advisory fee and the number of shareholder accounts is not clear a priori. 
 
2.1.2. Market factors 
Due to its largely unconstrained nature, the advisory fee will depend on the contract 
environment (Jensen and Meckling (1976), Deli (2002)). Moreover, if the mutual fund 
market is self disciplinary and competitive, advisers that fail to be competitive on the 
advisory fee should be driven out of the market. Luo (2002) reports that competition 
within the fund objective --measured by a Herfindahl index-- has a decreasing effect on 
the mark-up of management fees. This proxy also suggests that competition will be 
stronger if there are more funds in an objective or the assets are more equally distributed. 
Therefore, I expect the advisory fee to decrease as the objective gets more competitive. 
 
Besides the competition, the optimal advisory fee will be affected by the market norms if 
the adviser actually benchmarks them. In that case, the adviser would take the 
competitors’ advisory fees into account while determining his or her own advisory fee. 
Thus, if the common argument in the fund proxies stating that the advisory fee is set with 
respect to similar funds’ is valid, then I should observe the adviser adjusting the advisory 
fee according to the objective average. For example, if an adviser sets the advisory fee 
equal to the objective average, a decrease in the objective average would require an 
advisory fee adjustment. 
 
2.1.3. Fund performance 
The literature suggests that bearing the cost of load fees or higher expense ratios does not 
necessarily lead to better returns for investment.2 Furthermore, there is a tradeoff 
between higher costs and excess return. Nevertheless, the adviser is likely to try to justify 
an increase in the advisory fee by implying better performance is a signal of superior 
management skills. Similarly, if performance is poor, the adviser is likely to be 
monitored more closely. Kuhnen (2005) suggests that the advisory fee decreases when 
the fund is within the group of the lowest two deciles of unadjusted performers. 
 
If the investor reacts to simple performance measures as Sirri and Tufano (1998) suggest 
then beating the market benchmark or objective average could be used to justify an 
increase in advisory fee. Thus, a fund that beats its benchmark may be able to 
successfully signal superior management skills. 
 
2.1.4. Adviser’s decisions 
As mentioned above, the literature argues that the advisory contracts are largely the 
products of advisory firms themselves. Thus, the contractual advisory fee should not be 
independent from the adviser’s decisions. The first group of these decisions is directly 
related to portfolio management such as outsourcing the research service or the use of 
derivatives. These decisions would be mainly cost reduction motivated and would be 
                                                 
2 Ippolitto (1989), Elton, Gruber, Das, Hlavka (1993), Grinblatt and Titman (1994), Droms 
and Walker (1994), Gruber (1996), and Fortin and Michelson (1996)  
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indirectly enforced by the market factors that limit the degree of possible mark-up for 
excess premium. The second group is management decisions that are not directly linked 
to the portfolio management such as voluntary fee reimbursement. The adviser is likely 
to consider the outcome of these decisions while reviewing the advisory fee. 
 
2.1.4.1. Research agreements and use of derivatives 
The adviser takes market dynamics as given and these factors play mostly a 
constraining role on the mark-up. However, there is a limit that the adviser can 
decrease the mark-up in order to remain competitive without decreasing the cost of 
portfolio management. In an attempt to reduce the cost or manipulate the advisory 
fee, the adviser may choose to alter portfolio management techniques or adopt 
additional procedures. In the case of successful reduction of the cost, the adviser 
chooses between passing on the reduction to shareholders as a lower advisory fee 
and keeping the excess rent as an indirect mark-up. 
 
One procedure would be outsourcing the research activity under agreements 
commonly known as “soft dollar agreements” or “soft dollar arrangements.” When 
the research activity is carried out by a separate entity, the adviser does not 
necessarily change the cost structure of portfolio management but rather manipulates 
it. The cost of research which would otherwise be paid out of the advisory fee is 
transferred from shareholders in the form of brokerage fees. In this case, less rent 
transfer from shareholders under the advisory fee should be enough to accomplish 
the remaining portfolio management functions. Thus, advisers that enter research 
agreements should have lower advisory fees if they pass the reduction on to the 
shareholders. 
 
Another procedure would be the use of derivatives. Even if the use of derivatives as 
an alternative portfolio management tool requires the mutual fund board’s approval, 
it is the fund management that decides to actually use them. Deli and Varma (2002) 
suggest that approval of derivatives varies between different types of funds based on 
the risk involved. Thus, the use of the derivatives is not independent from the 
adviser’s marginal product. Although Koski and Pontiff (1999) find that funds use 
derivatives as a means of reducing the transaction costs that are necessary to keep a 
given portfolio exposure, Deli (2002) argues that there is no significant relation 
between the use of derivatives and the advisory fee. On the other hand, it is possible 
that the adviser proposes the successful use of derivatives as a signal of superior 
management skill. 
 
2.1.4.2. Adviser’s management decisions 
Deli (2002) suggests that equity and domestic funds with higher numbers of services 
have higher advisory fees. However, services that are reported in fund’s NSAR 
filings3 under item 54 are the services that the adviser provides, but is not fully 
                                                 
3 (1) Occupancy and office rental (2) Clerical and bookkeeping services (3) Accounting 
services (4) Services of independent auditors (5) Services of outside counsel (6) Registration 
and filing fees (7)Stationery, supplies and printing (8) Salaries & compensation of 
Registrant’s interested directors (9)Salaries & compensation of Registrant’s disinterested 
directors (10) Salaries & compensation of Registrant’s officers who are not directors (11) 
Reports to current shareholders (12) Determination of offering and redemption prices (13) 
Trading department (14) Prospectus preparation and printing for current shareholders (15) 
Other  
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reimbursed by the fund.4 In case of non-reimbursement, the adviser has the option to 
adjust the advisory fee or forgo non-reimbursement probably because the current 
advisory contract already includes the necessary mark-up. Furthermore, the 
adviser’s response to non-reimbursement may differ between the services based on 
the structure of the service. If the cost of the service is mostly fixed and the adviser 
could predetermine the approximate cost allocated to a specific fund (i.e. occupancy 
of office rental), he or she can make necessary adjustments to advisory fee in 
advance. On the other hand, if the cost of the service varies based on changing fund 
characteristics, or if the service is solely used by the fund, the adviser could choose 
to adjust the advisory fee following the non-reimbursement of the service. Salaries 
and compensation of independent directors is a good example for this type of 
service. Compensation of directors not only depends on the changing workload of 
the fund but also on the fact that each fund compensates its board members 
separately. Thus, the non-reimbursement of these types of services may increase the 
advisory fee ex post.  
 
Another management decision of the adviser is how the payment of gross 
administrative fee would be. Funds pay the gross administrative fee separately or 
bundled with the gross advisory fee. In the bundled case, the fund reports in the 
NSAR a gross administrative fee of zero. Therefore, a fund that reports a positive 
administrative fee in the NSAR is expected to report a lower advisory fee compared 
to a similar fund that reports the two costs combined. Latzko (1999) finds larger 
economies of scale in administrative services cost. Therefore, any existing 
economies of scale should not be affected even if the administrative fee and the 
advisory fee are bundled. 
 
Christoffersen (2001) suggests that ex ante contracting is affected by the possibility 
of ex post voluntary reimbursement by the advisory firm. The best signal for the 
possibility of ex post voluntary reimbursement is likely to be the ex ante 
reimbursement. Thus, I control for the amount of ex ante voluntary reimbursement. 
 
Overall, in a competitive market where the advisory fee contracts are dynamically 
managed, the advisory fee contract is based on but not limited to the fund 
characteristics. The advisory fee management would be affected by a set of factors. 
Successfully signaling superior management skills (i.e. higher quality marginal 
product) may give the adviser the opportunity for additional mark-up. However, in a 
dynamic market the adviser is expected to respond to the competitors’ price and 
market structure as well. The reduction of mark-up solely based on market factors is 
limited and enforces cost reduction as an alternative in order to remain competitive. 
The adviser could reduce the portfolio management cost either by using more 
sophisticated techniques such as derivatives or simply manipulate the advisory fee 
by adopting procedures such as the “soft dollar agreement”. Besides these cost 
                                                                                                                   
 
4 NSAR asks the fund (the registrant) to provide the following information under item 54 
“Indicate below whether services were supplied or paid for wholly or in substantial part by 
investment adviser(s) or administrator(s) in connection with the advisory or administrative 
contract(s) but for which the adviser(s) or administrator(s) are not reimbursed by the 
Registrant:” 
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reduction techniques, outcomes of the adviser’s management decisions would also 
have a significant effect on the advisory fee. 
3. Data and Methodology 
The data covers a 9-year period from 1996 to 2004. 1996 was picked as the beginning 
year since SEC started to make the filing of NSAR a requirement for a subsample of 
funds in 1994 and for the whole industry beginning in 1996. The information was 
collected from the fund proxy reports, the NSAR-B, the SAI (Statement of Additional 
Information) and the CRSP Survivorship Free Mutual Fund Database. Table 1 provides a 
list of variables with their sources and definitions. 
 
Table 1. List of variables names, sources and definitions 
Name Source Definition 
Fund specific factors and 
Adviser size 
  
Fund size NSAR-B Natural log of fund size reported under 74T 
measured in millions of dollar 
Adviser Size CRSP Total Net Asset of all funds managed by the 
same adviser listed in a year 
Num. of shareholder 
account NSAR-B As reported under 74X in thousands of account 
Turnover NSAR-B Lowest of the purchase or sales divided by the 
weighted average assets 
Fund Objective CRSP Fund objective in CRSP 
   
Market factors   
Herfindahl Index CRSP-Calculated Herfindahl Index of fund objective 
Fee ratio SAI Proportion of fund management fee to fund 
objective average 
Fund performance   
FFAR CRSP-Calculated Fama French four factor adjusted returns 
Beat benchmark CRSP-Calculated 
D=1 if fund total net return is higher than fund 
benchmark 
Spread b/w benchmark CRSP-Calculated 
Difference between fund return and fund 
benchmark 
Beat objective average CRSP-Calculated 
D=1 if fund total return is higher than funds 
within the same objective  
Spread b/w objective 
avrg. 
CRSP-
Calculated 
Difference between fund return and fund 
objective average 
Adviser’s decisions    
Research agreement NSAR-B D=1 if fund purchase research service 
Derivatives used NSAR-B D=1 if fund management actually use derivates  
Derivatives allowed NSAR-B D=1 if fund management is contractually allowed to use derivates  
Number of services non-
reimbursed NSAR-B Number of services reported under item 54 
Types of services non-
reimbursed NSAR-B 
Dummy=1 if certain service is reported as non-
reimbursed 
Fee reimbursement NSAR-B Dollar amount reimbursed divided by total fund 
assets 
Percent administrative 
fee NSAR-B 
Administrative fee under 72G divided by total 
net assets 
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To construct the sample, I select randomly among the actively managed equity funds on 
the CRSP Survivorship Free Mutual Fund Database after excluding index funds and 
funds that are managed by Vanguard. Data are limited to equity funds in order to make 
the collection process manageable, and most prior literature focuses on equity funds. The 
management of Vanguard is structurally different than rest of the industry. Index funds 
were eliminated because these funds are not actively managed. Multiple classes of the 
same fund were also eliminated, thus the final list included each fund only once. One 
possible concern may be that large fund families such as Fidelidity are likely to appear 
more frequently, leading to a selection bias. However, considering the ongoing fee 
competition between major fund families, it cannot be ruled out that an advisory firm 
which has more weight in the industry might also have more influence on the industry 
norms. Moreover, as mentioned above it is widely stated in fund proxies that comparing 
the fee rate of the fund with the fee rate of similar funds is a common method. Thus, any 
bias in the sample set due to this reason will also be valid for the population itself. 
 
Funds are grouped according to their objective as defined in the CRSP Database. 
The weight of each objective in the initial sample set was determined based on the 
weight of the objective in the whole set of funds. For example, if there are 100 funds 
that were active in the industry sometime between 1996 and 2004, and 20 of these 
funds are aggressive growth funds; then my sample set was constructed such that 
20% of it consists of aggressive growth funds. The final data set consist of 176 
funds, 109 of which are still active and 67 are dead. These 176 funds are managed 
by 125 different advisers. 
 
I collect the information about the funds and the advisers from the funds’ NSAR-B and 
SAI. The advisory fee reported in fund NSAR-B at the end of a fiscal year is taken as the 
applied advisory fee during that past fiscal year. The adviser is assumed to determine the 
applied advisory fee after observing the information at the beginning of the fiscal year. 
For example, the advisory fee reported in January 2000 NSAR-B is taken as the applied 
advisory fee for the year 1999 based on the information available to the adviser at the 
beginning of 1999, reported in January 1999 NSAR-B.  
 
For the model in Table 4 the dependent variable is the weighted advisory fee 
measured in basis points. The study is limited to funds that have contracts defining 
advisory fee as a percentage of total assets. Deli (2002) shows that the majority of 
the advisory fee contracts have asset based fixed or scaled fee structures. Under a 
scaled fee contract, different fee rates are applied to different ranges of assets. In the 
case of scaled fee contract, asset weighted advisory fee is calculated by multiplying 
each fee level with the amount of asset the fee is applied to using the total weighted 
average asset of the fund reported in NSAR-B. Thus, the first fixed effects model for 
fund “i” where the advisory fee is regressed on lagged variables (except research 
agreement dummy) is as follows; 
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Where the independent variables are fund size, adviser size, number of shareholder 
accounts, objective Herfindahl index, objective management fee average, Fama French 
four factor adjusted return, “use of derivatives” dummy, research dummy, percent non-
reimbursement, percent fee reimbursement and percent administrative fee respectively. 
Detailed definitions and the calculations of the variables are given in Table 1. 
 
Fama French 4 factor adjusted return 5 is replaced with a “beat fund objective 
average return” dummy in model 2 and is replaced with the spread between the fund 
return and the objective average in model 3. Services are entered separately in model 
4. Hausmann tests favored fixed effects model. However, recent literature raises 
concern about the use of a more restricted fixed effects model arguing that 
governance structures of corporations are too dynamic to assume that uncontrolled 
variables are constant throughout the sample period. Therefore, such assumption 
could lead to spurious results (Zhou 2001). Furthermore, the random effect models 
allow for the inclusion of non-variant variables. Model 5 is the random effects 
model with the additional non-variant variables of dead fund dummy and fund 
objective. Results of both methods are reported for robustness check.  
 
The Herfindahl index of each objective is calculated in order to control for the 
competitiveness of the objective. Using the notation of Luo (2002), the calculation 
of the objective’s Herfindahl index ),( iIh  is as follows: 
 
 ∑ ∑∈
∈



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


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=
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Ij
j
k
A
AiIh
2
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Where ∑
∈Ij
j
k
A
A
 is the share of net assets of fund k relative to the total net assets in 
the category. 
 
Luo (2002) argues that if the competition among the advisers in an objective is Bertrand 
competition then all advisers’ services are assumed to be homogeneous and equal. 
Therefore, I should observe the advisers pricing their services equal to the marginal cost 
of the product regardless of the number of advisers in the market. This would be the 
                                                 
5 Intercept of the regression analysis where excess fund return is regressed on Fama and 
French four factors: small to big (SMB), high minus low (HML), excess return on market 
(MKTRF) and momentum. Values for factors are obtained from CRSP Survivorship Free 
Mutual Fund Database. 
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same as saying one adviser is not different than another, which is a strong assumption in 
the mutual fund industry. Furthermore, Sutton (1991) shows that, over a broad class of 
oligopoly models, there is not necessarily a relation between the number of market 
participants and the variable part of the cost of the product. Thus, normalized Herfindahl 
indices are calculated following Luo’s (2002) technique. 
 
Specifically, the normalized Herfindahl index for category I in which fund i belong, 
denoted Iih , is defined as: 
 
 1),(
),(
−=
iIh
iIhh
c
I
i  (3) 
 
Where Ic NiIh /1),( = ; IN denotes the number of funds in mutual fund 
category. 
The normalized Herfindahl index characterizes the relative competitiveness of the 
objective to which the fund belongs compared to the case where net assets are 
equally distributed among all funds within the objective. For example, it takes the 
value of one if there exists one fund in an objective.6 
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 specifies that the asset weighted advisory fee mean is 73.17, median is 73.29 
basis points. Partitioning the sample set based on the contract type reveals that fixed 
fee funds’ average advisory fee is 7.25 basis points higher than funds with concave 
fee contracts. Results also provide preliminary evidence suggesting that use of 
derivatives is negatively related with the advisory fee. Although all have linear fee 
structures, fixed fee funds that use derivatives have on average lower advisory fee 
(79.79 bp.) than the fixed fee funds that do not (72.47 bp). Furthermore, the funds 
that fail to survive during the sample period have 0.119% higher advisory fee 
suggesting that competitive fee pricing may be necessary for survival. 
 
Table 2. Advisory Fee Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A 
      
Advisory Fee (basis points) N Mean Median Std. dev. 1st Quar. 3rd Quar. 
All observations 1334 73.17 73.29 21.21 45.00 115.00 
Fixed fee 736 76.48 75.00 20.84 45.00 115.00 
Scaled fee 598 69.23 66.57 21.01 45.75 115.25 
 
    
  
Panel B 
    
  
Fixed fee use derivatives 251 72.47 74.00 19.13 56.25 118.75 
Fixed fee no use of derivatives 338 79.79 75.00 20.86 56.25 118.75 
Dead funds 372 80.52 75.00 24.17 56.25 118.75 
Live funds 962 70.33 70.00 19.21 45.00 115.00 
                                                 
6
 I repeated tests without normalizing the Herfindahl index as suggested by Luo (2002). 
Results remained qualitatively the same. 
Yaman Ö. ERZURUMLU 182
Table 3 shows that average fund size is $254.55 million and average advisory size is 
$9506.09 million. Average fund turnover is 90.48%. Funds do not fully reimburse 
the management company, on average, for 6 services. Although, average voluntary 
reimbursement of fees is equal to 21 basis points of net assets, the median is 0 basis 
points, indicating that a significant number of funds do not reimburse fees. The 
number of years that the funds voluntarily reimburse fees accounts for 47% of all 
observations. Administrative fee has the same skewed distribution. Although the 
average administrative fee is 0.11% of the total net assets, the median is just 0.013% 
since some funds combine the administrative costs with the advisory fee, and report 
administrative expenses in NSAR as $0. The number of years that the administrative 
fee is equal to zero accounts for 47% of the observations. Funds receive research 
service from an outside source for 81% of the fund years7, and use derivatives as a 
management tool for 44% of the fund years indicating that these practices are not 
rare among funds. 
 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables 
Panel A 
  
Variables Mean Median 
Fund size ($ million) 254.55 275.63 
Adviser size ($ million) 9506.09 14445.80 
Turnover 90.48 68.00 
Services 5.80 6.00 
% reimbursement 0.21% 0.00% 
Num of account (thousand) 7374.75 10721.0 
Percent Administrative cost 0.11% 0.013% 
Panel B 
  
Variables 1 0 
Research Agreement 81% 19% 
Use of derivatives 44% 56% 
 
Preliminary tests not reported here reveal that correlations between the advisory fee 
and other types of rent transfer (i.e. loads and 12b-1) are positive and below 0.58. 
Thus, one type of rent transfer is not used systematically as substitute for another.8 
                                                 
7 These are the funds that stated that the item 26B in fund NSAR-B “receipt of investment 
research and statistical information” as one of the “considerations which affected the 
participation of brokers or dealers or other entities in commissions or other compensation paid 
on portfolio transactions of Registrant” 
 
8 Advisory fee is the only form of rent transfer to the adviser solely for the purpose of 
portfolio management service and represents the largest component of total fee. Nevertheless, 
it is not the only form of rent transfer to adviser. Thus, one may argue that an adviser who 
transfers enough rent through other sources (such as 12b-1 and loads) may accept a lower 
advisory fee. 
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Finally, all VIF (variance inflation factor) values are below 3, suggesting that there 
is no serious multicollinearity between independent variables.9 
 
4.2. Advisory Fee 
 
4.2.1. Fund specific factors and adviser size 
Table 4 reports results from the model (1) which dependent variable is the basis 
point advisory fee. Results indicate that larger funds have lower advisory fees, 
consistent with the previous literature and supports the existence of economies of 
scale. It also implies that funds that manage to survive and grow reduce the advisory 
fee. However, a positive relation between the adviser size and the advisory fee 
indicates that as the adviser grows, he or she charges higher advisory fees. I interpret 
this result as the adviser reflecting the increasing market power to shareholders as 
assets under the management grow. 
 
4.2.2. Market factors 
The positive relation between the fee ratio and the advisory fee indicate that the 
objective average management fee is benchmarked. However, this benefits the 
shareholder only when there is a decrease in the objective advisory fee. For example, 
if the objective average advisory fee and the fund advisory fee ratio is 1 and the 
objective average advisory fee increases and ratio becomes 2, the adviser negotiates 
for higher advisory fee for the following fiscal year. Similarly, if the ratio is 2 and 
decreases to 1 after the objective average advisory fee decreases, the adviser 
approves lower advisory fee for the following fiscal year. However, the Herfindahl 
index and the advisory fee are not significantly related indicating that the advisory 
fee is not managed based on the objective asset concentration.10 
 
4.2.3. Fund returns 
Results indicate that performance improvement does not necessarily signal superior 
management skill leading to additional mark-up. Thus, the advisers tend to prefer to 
benefit from investor’s “return chasing” behavior, additional fund inflow following 
a performance improvement (Sirri and Tufano 1998). Further the second model 
where the Fama-French 4 factor adjusted return is replaced by the dummy variable 
equal to one if the fund beats the benchmark implies similar results. However, in 
model 3 where the adjusted return is replaced by the spread between the benchmark 
and the adjusted fund performance suggest that sufficient spread between the 
benchmark and the fund return is followed by additional mark-up. Although an 
adviser who beats the benchmark index does not necessarily signal superior 
management skills, performance improvement seems to be sufficient if the fund 
return exceeds a certain threshold for signaling superior management. Table 5 
reports the robustness check where the market benchmark is replaced by the 
objective average return. Results are qualitatively the same. 
                                                 
9 Although there is no certain threshold in statistics for determining multicollinearity based 
on VIF values, 10 is considered as the conservative threshold (Neter, Wasserman and Kutner 
1985). 
10
 This result is consistent with Warner and Wu (2005) where in a different and limited model 
they study the role of economies of scale, advisor ability and industry competition on 
advisory fee contracts. 
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Table 4. Panel Model Regressions of Advisory Fee 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Constant     75.820*** (4.310) 
Fund specific factors and 
Adviser size      
Fund size -1.061*** (0.416) 
-1.076*** 
(0.414) 
-1.296*** 
(0.422) 
-1.179*** 
(0.420) 
-0.812** 
(0.406) 
Adviser size 0.846*** (0.327) 
0.837*** 
(0.325) 
0.840*** 
(0.324) 
0.961*** 
(0.321) 
-0.070 
(0.286) 
Turnover -1.8E-04 (0.001) 
-2.2E-04 
(0.001) 
-6.0E-04 
(0.001) 
3.0E-04 
(0.001) 
1.0E-04 
(0.001) 
Number of accounts -0.245 (0.329) 
-0.245 
(0.325) 
-0.101 
(0.329) 
-0.145 
(0.327) 
-0.456 
(0.296) 
Dead fund dummy     2.670 (2.507) 
Objective Dummy     included 
Market factors      
Herfindahl -0.039 (0.040) 
-0.043 
(0.040) 
-0.050 
(0.040) 
-0.052 
(0.040) 
-0.022 
(0.041) 
Fee Ratio 4.89*** (1.46) 
4.76*** 
(1.47) 
4.36*** 
(1.47) 
4.46*** 
(1.47) 
8.050*** 
(1.45) 
Fund performance      
FFAR 1.044 (1.35)     
Beat Benchmark  0.377 (0.343)    
Spread b/w benchmark   2.227*** (0.831) 
1.851** 
(0.826) 
1.579* 
(0.824) 
Adviser’s decisions      
Research Agreement -2.596*** (0.734) 
-2.562*** 
(0.725) 
-2.548*** 
(0.722) 
-2.231*** 
(0.723) 
-2.257*** 
(0.715) 
Derivatives used -1.634** (0.778) 
-1.616** 
(0.776) 
-1.619** 
(0.773) 
-1.564** 
(0.764) 
-1.650** 
(0.748) 
Number of service not 
reimbursed 
-0.010 
(0.129) 
-0.009 
(0.129) 
-6.5E-04 
(0.128)   
Basis points reimburse. 0.013*** (0.005) 
0.013*** 
(0.004) 
0.011** 
(0.005) 
0.011** 
(0.005) 
0.014*** 
(0.004) 
Percent admin. cost -0.058*** (0.014) 
-0.057*** 
(0.014) 
-0.056*** 
(0.014) 
-0.055*** 
(0.014) 
-0.054*** 
(0.013) 
Services      
Occupancy of office rental    -5.175*** (1.217) 
-4.745*** 
(1.194) 
Salary & Compen. of 
disinterested directors    
6.235*** 
(2.000) 
6.349** 
(1.990) 
Salary & Compen. of officers    2.103** (0.930) 
1.994** 
(0.9810) 
Models Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Random 
Number of Funds 174 173 173 173 173 
R2 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.26 
***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively. Standard deviations are given in 
parenthesis. 
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4.2.4. Adviser’s decisions 
Further results indicate that the adviser’s decisions related to portfolio management 
that will reduce the cost of management or just manipulate the advisory fee without 
a fundamental change to the overall cost affect the advisory fee. Decisions such as 
the use of derivatives, the research agreements, separating administrative fee and fee 
reimbursements are used in order to remain competitive and for indirect mark-up. 
 
4.2.4.1. Use of derivatives and research agreements 
One optional technique is the use of derivatives (options or futures). The negative 
result between the use of derivatives and the advisory fee supports Koski and 
Pointiff’s (1999) argument that the use of derivatives reduces the cost of portfolio 
management. Certainly, the result does not rule out the argument that ability to use 
derivatives being taken as a signal of superior management skill which could lead to 
an advisory fee increase; yet, the benefit seems to exceed the potential cost of it. 
Although the use of derivatives has to be approved by the fund board before they are 
actually used by the adviser, the robustness check in Table 5 shows that the approval 
does not lead to a decrease in the advisory fee. Thus, the approval of the use of 
derivatives by the board does not automatically signal that the adviser has superior 
management skills. 
 
Another optional procedure is outsourcing the research activity. In this case, the cost 
of research which would otherwise be paid out of the advisory fee is transferred 
from the shareholder in the form of a brokerage fee. Such an agreement gives the 
adviser the opportunity to reduce the advisory fee without a fundamental reduction 
in the overall cost of portfolio management. Positive result between the research 
dummy and advisory fee suggests that funds with such agreements have 
significantly lower advisory fees. 
 
4.2.4.2. Adviser’s management decisions 
One of the adviser’s management decisions is whether to bundle the gross 
administrative fee with the gross advisory fee. Results imply that the advisory fee is 
lower for the funds that pay a separate gross administration fee. Another 
management decision of the adviser is voluntary fee reimbursement. Christoffersen 
(2001) suggests that expense reimbursements negotiated at the end of the year are 
direct mechanism of temporary increase in fund returns thus rebalancing rent 
transfer to shareholders. The contract environment is affected by the possibility of 
this ex post reimbursement by the adviser. A signal of the possible ex post 
reimbursement practice is voluntary reimbursement during the previous fiscal year. I 
find that ex ante voluntary fee reimbursement leads to a higher advisory fee. Thus, 
previous voluntary fee reimbursement is likely to be taken as a signal for possible 
fee reimbursement in the future. In this case, the contractual fee might include some 
amount of mark-up that is expected to be ex post reimbursed. Such mark-up gives 
the adviser opportunity to manage the rent transfer after the contract is created. 
 
The fourth and fifth models in Table 4 provide further evidence on non-reimbursed 
services. In these two models, the aggregate number of non-reimbursed services is 
replaced by the dummy variables for the services listed in the NSAR. VIF values of all 
services are below 4.03 indicating that there is no serious multicollinearity between 
services. Only statistically significant results are reported in Table 4. Although the total 
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number of non-reimbursed services and the advisory fee do not reveal any significant 
relation in previous models, results in the last two models in Table 4 indicate that 
advisers do not follow a uniform strategy for the non-reimbursement among services. 
Results indicate that the adviser adjusts the advisory fee if the adviser is not fully 
reimbursed for the disinterested directors’ and officers’ compensation. The result 
supports the positive relation between independent director compensation and advisory 
fee.11 The negative result of office rental could be due to the predictability of the cost 
which gives the adviser the opportunity to make necessary mark-up ex ante. 
Furthermore, funds might benefit from economies of scale since cost of office rent is 
allocated between funds under the management of the same adviser. 
 
Table 5. Robustness Tests for Advisory Fee 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Fund specific factors and Adviser size     
Fund size -0.934** (0.412) 
-1.214*** 
(0.422) 
-1.207*** 
(0.422) 
Adviser size 0.809** (0.325) 
0.857*** 
(0.325) 
0.882*** 
(0.326) 
Turnover -1.04E-04 (0.001) 
-4.2E-04 
(0.001) 
-4.4E-04 
(0.001) 
Number of accounts -0.336 (0.326) 
-0.136 
(0.332) 
-0.155 
(0.332) 
Market factors    
Herfindahl -0.039 (0.039) 
-0.037 
(0.039) 
-0.037 
(0.040) 
Fee Ratio 5.09*** (1.465) 
4.61*** 
(1.467) 
4.81*** 
(1.472) 
Fund performance    
Beat objective average -0.525 (0.386)   
Spread b/w average  1.817* (0.940) 
1.867** 
(0.941) 
Adviser’s decisions    
Research Agreement -2.602*** (0.726) 
-2.431*** 
(0.725) 
-2.475*** 
(0.725) 
Derivatives used -1.612** (0.776) 
-1.560** 
(0.775)  
Derivatives contractually allowed   -1.123 (0.919) 
Number of service not reimbursed 0.021 (0.129) 
-8.9E-04 
(0.129) 
-0.010 
(0.130) 
Basis points reimbursement 0.014*** (0.005) 
0.012** 
(0.005) 
0.012** 
(0.005) 
Percent administrative cost -0.058*** (0.014) 
-0.056*** 
(0.014) 
-0.056*** 
(0.014) 
Number of Funds 174 173 174 
R2 0.09 0.07 0.07 
***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively. Standard deviations are given in 
parenthesis. 
 
                                                 
11
 Tufano and Sevick (1997), Del Guercio et al. (2003), Khorana et al. (2005) 
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4.4 Limitations 
Results suggest neither a form of causality nor an order of the factors. While determining 
the optimal advisory fee, each adviser is likely to give different weights to each factor 
but the results do not imply that the advisers favor one type of factors over another. 
Moreover, results should be interpreted carefully and not be taken as rejection of any 
alternative theory. Performance is a good example for this phenomenon. Results suggest 
that superior performance is rewarded by a higher advisory fee but they do not refute the 
alternative theory of performance improvement as a result of excess resource allocation. 
 
Furthermore, the advisory fee could be driven by some unaccounted factors. For 
example, the study does not fully capture the possible effect of the adviser marginal 
product. Any uncaptured difference between marginal products of the advisers could be 
partially responsible for the variation of advisory fee. However, this is minimized 
through the use of a panel model. 
 
The data set is limited to actively managed equity funds. The literature documents 
qualitatively similar results between the fund characteristics and the advisory fee of 
different types of funds. Nevertheless, the relations between the advisory fee and other 
factors investigated in this study like market norms, superior performance and use of 
alternative portfolio techniques could be qualitatively and quantitatively different for 
other types of funds.  
 
Finally, as Deli (2002) notes, there may be factors which have the potential to be 
substitutes for the advisory fee that are not observed such as the adviser’s ownership of 
the fund. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The determination of the advisory fee is based on, but not limited to, fund specific 
characteristics. Market norms as well as the choice of portfolio techniques and 
management decisions affect the adviser’s decision about the price of the professional 
portfolio management. Although the evidence suggests that the effect of market factors 
on the advisory fee is moderate, the adviser’s decisions that would reduce the cost of 
management or just manipulate the advisory fee without a fundamental change to the 
overall cost have relatively stronger impact on the advisory fee. 
 
The advisers systematically adjust the advisory fee based on the objective average as it is 
commonly stated in fund proxies. However, this benefits the shareholders only when the 
objective average declines. I find that the improvement of adjusted performance or 
beating the benchmark index is not sufficient for the adviser to negotiate for an increase 
of the advisory fee. Advisers successfully signal superior managerial skills for additional 
mark-up if the fund beats the benchmark index or objective average by a significant 
spread. In a competitive market, the limited nature of the reduction of mark-up without 
altering the cost structure would enforce cost reduction in order to remain competitive. I 
show that advisers successfully use derivatives to reduce the cost of portfolio 
management or engage in research agreements partially to manipulate the advisory fee 
without necessarily changing the total cost. 
 
I also show that besides the adviser’s decisions that are directly related to portfolio, 
advisers actively manage the advisory fee based on the outcomes of their management 
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decisions. The funds that report the gross administrative fee and gross advisory fee 
separate have lower advisory fees. Ex ante voluntary fee reimbursement affects the ex 
post contracting leading to higher advisory fee and the adviser increases the advisory fee 
if there is non-reimbursement for the compensation of independent directors and officers. 
 
There are several issues that require further research. While my results suggest that 
advisers reduce the advisory fee if they have research agreements, they do not provide 
insight on whether the shareholders benefit overall from the transfer of the cost of 
research from the advisory fee to the brokerage fee. The results do not address to what 
degree the persistence of superior performance requires allocation of additional resource 
and if superior performance covers the cost of this additional resource. Finally, the role 
of mutual fund boards in negotiating the advisory fee requires further attention. 
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